tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-520740383609345670.post7288975837136555875..comments2014-03-05T11:21:57.267-08:00Comments on Manitoba Philosophy: I Could Have Failed to Be a PersonDamian Melamedoffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17696747676972679428noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-520740383609345670.post-91984807112632714152014-03-05T11:21:57.267-08:002014-03-05T11:21:57.267-08:00@Anonymous: thanks for the comments. I think that ...@Anonymous: thanks for the comments. I think that there are moments in my exposition where I beg the question (like when I just assert that embryos have no rights without any argument; see my response to Dan), but I'm not sure I'm begging the question in the case you point out. I think the problem is that I was a bit sloppy and used the phrase "in order for", which can be interpreted in several ways. So let me make my defense of that step more explicit:<br />(RIGHTS) All persons have rights.<br />The premise (RIGHTS) makes no claim about why rights (or personhood) are recognized. It could be that something has rights because it is a person, or it could be that something is a person because it has rights. Or the story could be more complicated. Whatever the story one tells is, I think there are good reasons to think that (RIGHTS) is true. But (RIGHTS) is enough to get me from 'embryos have no rights' to 'embryos are not persons'. So it's not clear to me that my argument is question begging.Damian Melamedoffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17696747676972679428noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-520740383609345670.post-75274958756294028402014-03-01T13:19:40.477-08:002014-03-01T13:19:40.477-08:00I think the tension in this argument lies in your ...I think the tension in this argument lies in your defence of proposition (2). It seems to me that you are confusing the cause and effect of personhood and rights: "in order for something to be a person, it must have rights". Rights are recognized because of a 'things' personhood; as opposed to personhood being recognized because of a 'things' rights. The argument you are running ultimately is question begging insofar as your criterion for personhood is 'it must have rights', which presupposes personhood in the first place. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-520740383609345670.post-37789242750031106952013-11-30T09:02:50.906-08:002013-11-30T09:02:50.906-08:00@Carolyn: Thanks for the Kit Fine information. I&#...@Carolyn: Thanks for the Kit Fine information. I've change the post to reflect this.<br />@Dan: I think that you're right in that there are these two ways in which we can use the word 'I': one which refers to me, and one which refers to my body. I'm wondering, though, if something can be said here to push for 'I used to be in my mother's uterus' to be read as endorsing both senses, while 'I want to be cremated' to be read as just one.<br />My thought is as follows. When I claim 'I want to be cremated after I die', someone might interject and say: 'you mean you want your body cremated, right? You won't be around!' I'm inclined to think that most people will agree with the interjector and accept their disambiguation.<br />Suppose now that somebody says 'I used to kick a lot in my mother's uterus', and somebody interjects 'you mean your body used to kick a lot, right? you weren't around!' I'm less inclined here to accept the interjector's point. I would say that my body kicked a lot, but so did I! <br />I don't know if there's much to this point, but my intuitions go that way.<br />In terms of the morally relevant stuff, you're right. There is a lot to be said about what it takes to be a person. I just (unfairly) assumed that most people agree that embryos are not persons.Damian Melamedoffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17696747676972679428noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-520740383609345670.post-72582870549745714772013-11-29T20:22:53.702-08:002013-11-29T20:22:53.702-08:00The tension here might lie in an equivocation betw...The tension here might lie in an equivocation between two uses of 'I'. It's sometimes acceptable to use 'I' to refer to one's body, as in 'I want to be cremated after I die'. It could be that when you say 'I used to be an embryo', you're referring to your body, which used to be an embryo. You body, however, has no rights. You have rights, and that's why people have to respect your body.<br />If you're referring to a person when you use 'I', it's unclear whether you used to be an embryo. One might think you came to be when you started having consciousness, or, if you go old school with your metaphysics of persons, you came to be when you started doing logic.<br /><br />One might also dispute your premise that embryos have no rights. Embryos differ from Fungi in their future potential, which may be morally relevant. Danhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02122784992711602521noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-520740383609345670.post-62377098641083181412013-11-24T23:03:38.370-08:002013-11-24T23:03:38.370-08:00This is the information you want for the Fine arti...This is the information you want for the Fine article (I think): <br />Fine, Kit. 2005. “Necessity and Non-Existence,” in Modality and Tense, New York: Oxford University Press (2005). 321-354.<br /><br />Carolyn Ghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12606839419391995711noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-520740383609345670.post-71926726555576990282013-11-16T13:19:05.195-08:002013-11-16T13:19:05.195-08:00It's been brought to my attention by David Doe...It's been brought to my attention by David Doerksen and Eric Hawley that I was not very clear on what I take to be a person. I assume that persons are what ethicists talk about when figuring out whether somebody has moral rights, or whether they have intrinsic moral value. This is pretty hand-wavey, but I hope it's clear enough to get the point across. Damian Melamedoffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17696747676972679428noreply@blogger.com