Adopt no point of view and you still have reasons to act.

This is a paper I wrote, (am writing?), for Rob's 2000 level class were you learn the truth about ethics.  Tell me what you think.

One of Sidgwick's tests for the highest certainty of a proposition is that no two people who are of equal intelligence, who also have the same body of evidence, disagree on the truth of the proposition. Sidgwick claims the proposition that, “The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other; unless, that is, there are special grounds for believing that more good is likely to be realized in the one case than in the other”, passes this test for highest certainty. This is the the axiom of irrelevance. Sidgwick takes as his epistemic peers the Egoist and the Common Sense Moralist. The axiom as stated must be modified slightly so that the Egoist and the Common Sense Moralist do in fact agree with it. I will argue that a single modification to the axiom, addressing the worries of both the Egoist and the Common Sense Moralist, is preferable to adding two separate modifications, dealing with the worries of each position separately.

According to the Egoist, what she ought to do is that which will bring about the most good, or happiness, in her life.  One way to modify Sidgwick's axiom of irrelevance so that the Egoist agrees with it is to have it be a conditional, having as its antecedent the adoption of the point of view of the universe, or put another way, the point of for which I have no special concern for my self. The axiom would then be: if the point of view for which I have no special concern for myself is adopted, then I ought be indifferent between distributing x to A or x to B unless more good would be produced by one distribution over the other. So the Egoist will accept this axiom because she will not adopt the point of view of the universe, though if she did, her duties would be different. Rather she will take the point of view of her self, according to which, she ought to be partial to A when A is her.

According to the Common Sense Moralist there is a prima facie duty, or reason, to keep ones promises. If I have promised to give you some cheese, but by breaking the promise I could bring my self more happiness than I could bring to you were I to keep the promise, then according to the Common Sense Moralist I ought to keep my promise. This contradicts irrelevance thus far stated, since keeping my promise is a reason to be partial to your happiness over mine. If the Common Sense Moralist is to accept the axiom of irrelevance, then it must be stated so as to give a reason, not the only reason, for distributing goods in a particular manner, allowing for other reasons to trump it in the relevant cases. So the axiom secondly modified becomes: if the point of view for which I have no special concern for myself is adopted, then there is a reason to be indifferent between distributing x to A or x to B unless more good would be produced by one distribution over the other.

If the Egoist does in fact refuse to adopt the point of view according to which she has no special concern for her self, and thereby takes up the view on which she only has concern for herself, then she will have the wrong thing to say in the following case:

Sue is on the last three days of her life, yet it will be her happiest, indeed it could not possibly be any happier. Sue knows this. Sue also knows that she could give her excess money to a person, thereby saving their life.

If the Egoist is right, Sue should not take up the point of view on which she has no special concern for herself.  Given that all she should aim at, according to the Egoist, is already guaranteed to be the case, the Egoist concludes that Sue has no reason to give the money that would save a life. Given that Sue ought to give the money, this is the wrong result.

At least for cases like Sue's, the Egoist could respond by adopting the point of view according to which she has no special concern for herself, given that no self interested reasons would be sacrificed. Sue really does not have any special concern for herself, since her greatest happiness is already determined. But in cases that are not like this, when an individuals own good is not so well secured, the Egoist will think their is reason to depart from distributing goods impartiality.

One way the Egoist could get the desired results, both in cases such as Sue's, as well as the normal cases, would be to argue that whatever point of view one adopts, its adoption is conditional on certain morally relevant features, such as the actual distribution of good. For Sue, she has reason to adopt the point of view of the universe on her last three days because the good in her life, determined to be as great as it could, does not give her any reason to have special concern for her self, and so, no reason to distribute good partially. On this picture, different distributions of good give correspondingly different reasons to adopt alternative points of view, where the adoption of each alternative point of view gives rise to a different reason to act.

Alternatively, the Egoist could insist that that, even if one adopts the point of view according to which I have no special concern for myself, I have a reason to be partial in distributing x to A rather than x to B when x will bring about some good to A and I am identical to A. On this picture, what one has reason to do is not conditional on which point of view is adopted, at least if it is the point of view of the universe.

Both options open to the Egoist will parallel the Common Sense Moralists contention that there is a reason to keep ones promises, as well as a reason to distribute goods impartially. Both the Egoist, and the Common Sense Moralist, will claim that there is more than one reason to act, placing different importance on what those reasons are and how strong each one is.

At this point, insisting that Sidgwick's axiom be conditional on the impersonal point of view is unnecessary. On the first option open to the Egoist, what ever reasons there will be to adopt one point of view over another, thereby leading to a reason to act in specific way, just is a reason to act in that specific way. As for the second option open to the Egoist, given that what reasons one has to act are reasons irrespective of what point of view one adopts, there is no need to specify that there is a reason to be impartial between different distributions of good only when the point of view of the universe is adopted, for one may adopt the point of view of ones self, yet still have this reason.  For the Common Sense Moralist, the prima facie duty to keep promises is a reason to keep ones own promises, not any other persons promise. The point of view of the promiser need not be adopted for me to have this duty. For the Egoist, the prima facie duty to aim at ones own good is a reason for you to aim at your own good, not everyones own good. Again, the point of view for which I have special concern for my self need not be adopted for me to have this duty.

The axiom of irrelevance now becomes: there is a reason to be indifferent between distributing x to A or x to B unless more good would be produced by one distribution over the other. If I am right, the Egoist and the Common Sense Moralist agree with this axiom and it passes one of Sidgwick's tests for highest certainty.

Handed Essentiality

In my last post, I argued that we have some reasons to think that (P) is true:
(P) Possibly, I am a concrete object that is not a person.

 

I then gave some reasons to think that (P) is not true. The two premises in that argument were:

(5) If I am essentially a person, then it is not possible for me to be a concrete object that is not a person.

(6) I am essentially a person.

 

The main problem with denying (5) is that this claim seems true by definition. We generally think that one of the necessary conditions of having an essential property is that you have it whenever you’re around. But definitions can be wrong, and maybe we were wrong in thinking that having a property whenever you’re around is necessary for that property being essential to you. So it's not impossible to deny (5). But it certainly seems difficult.

There are two big problems with denying (6): 

(i) It's weird to think that personhood is just an accidental property that we have. It really seems to be the case that being a person is central to our identity, or our nature. It is the kind of thing we are. But that is what essential properties are.

(ii) It's plausible to think that, were I to stop being a person, I would stop existing. But if personhood is not an essential property, it is hard to explain how this could be.

Here is what I'm going to try to do: I'm going to try to provide a picture of essentiality that allows the deniers of (5) to make their view less crazy, and the deniers of (6) to have better answers to (i) and (ii). In doing so, I will appeal indirectly to medieval discussions of eternality. The reason I am appealing indirectly is because I am having a really hard time finding source material on this (I think Duns Scotus talked about it, but I’m not sure. If anyone could point me to the right place, it would be much appreciated). 

Roughly, medieval philosophers had a problem with things that exist eternally, which was as follows:

(A) God exists eternally.

(B) Our souls exist eternally.

On the assumption that God and our souls both exist, both (A) and (B) appear to be true. But there is an important difference between God and our souls: our souls came into existence, while God did not. An attempt to explain the difference between the eternality that God has and the eternality that souls have was to distinguish between two types of eternality: left-hand eternality, and right-hand eternality. A particular being is left-hand eternal if it has always existed. A particular being is right-hand eternal if it will always exist. So (A) is true on both disambiguations of eternality, while (B) is only true on the right-hand disambiguation. Our souls, unlike God, are not left-hand eternal. It is important to note that there are several ways to relate the instantiation conditions of being eternal to the conditions of being left-hand eternal and being right-hand eternal. Maybe being eternal requires either being left-hand eternal or being right-hand eternal, in which case both (A) and (B) are true. Maybe being eternal requires both being left-hand eternal and being right-hand eternal, in which case only (A) is true. Either way, it seems like the notions of left- and right-handed eternality are still useful to explain differences between God and our souls.

I propose to import this distinction into discussions of essentiality. The thought is as follows:

Definition of left-hand essentiality: property F is a left-hand essential property of object o iff

(I) o has F.

(II) Were o to acquire F, o would not have previously been concrete.

Definition of right-hand essentiality: F is a right-hand essential property of o iff

(I) o has F.

(II) were o to lose F, o would not subsequently remain concrete.

Just like with the discussion of eternality, maybe being an essential property requires having both left- and right-hand essentiality. Maybe being an essential property requires just one. 

If both are required, then (5) is true: if I am essentially a person, then it is impossible for me to be a concrete object that is not a person. But it might not be so bad to reject the essentiality of personhood here. After all, we can still agree that personhood is right-hand essential, and that can explain many of the phenomena that we wanted essentiality to explain. Here's how:

To respond to (i): while acquiring personhood is may be an accident, maintaining personhood is not. So it is not too terrible to think that it is because of the kind of thing we are (persons), that we must remain persons. That's not the case for other accidental properties, like being a teenager. It is not in the nature of being a teenager that we must remain teenagers. So there is still a principled distinction between being a person and our standard accidental properties.

To respond to (ii): were you to stop being a person, you would stop existing. But this is not because personhood is essential, it is because personhood is right-hand essential

On the other hand, we could claim that essentiality only requires one of left- or right-hand essentiality. In this case, premise (6) is true: I am essentially a person. But we now how the resources to deny premise (5), since we can say that it is perfectly possible for me to be essentially a person even if I am sometimes not a person.

Maybe you have really strong intuitions about essentiality here, so that one move seems more plausible than the other (or maybe both seem equally implausible). I’m inclined to say that essentiality only requires one of left- or right-hand essentiality, and thereby reject (5). If this is right, then my argument constitutes an interesting discovery about the property of being a person: its essentiality is only right-handed.

Some issues/thoughts that I have:
#1: it seems that under my definition, being an author is a right-hand essential property. Once you write a book, you're an author forever. Here, I'm inclined to appeal to Cowling (forthcoming) in saying that only certain properties can be essences, and being an author is just not one of them.
#2: I'm wondering how much this account of essentiality can help people who think that everything necessarily exists. It seems to me that these handed essentiality is not much help to them, but I'm interested in looking at this further.
#3: Suppose you think that it is not possible for me not to have been a person. I think I can run this argument again with fetuses. A fetus is essentially a fetus, but it used to be a non-fetus (an embryo). Unless we think that there are a whole bunch of things going into and out of existence inside a uterus, we should think that some properties are right-hand essential. Thoughts?

Name and Subject Change

We've noticed a few things:
1) This is the only philosophy student blog in Manitoba.
2) Most of our posters/readers are not only interested in metaphysics.
3) Restricting this blog to a metaphysics-blog reinforces the false belief that there is a fundamental difference between metaphysicians and other philosophers.

How to solve this? Change this blog! Henceforth, this will be the Philosophy Student blog, where ALL philosophy students in Manitoba (the province, not just the university) will be allowed to post what they're working on.

There's not a lot rules. Keep it as brief as possible, keep it to one main idea per post. Make the argument as clear as you can. (If you're not allowed to post, contact the U of M facebook page and I'll make you a contributor).
Oh, and be nice! A lot of time on the blog will be spent on disagreements between people. If there is a post that I deem too aggressive, I reserve the right to delete it.

M: If sentence S is a metaphor, then S has a metaphorical meaning based on the intention of the speaker.

Do you agree with M? If yes, you need to change your mind, why? Look:

1- consider the linguistic structure x is y
2- There is no metaphorical meaning associated with x is y.

3- pick up two words randomly without any intentions,  For instance, tree and sky and insert them in the structure.

4- The sentence sky is tree is a metaphor.

5- There is no metaphorical meaning based on the intention of  the utterer for the sentence sky is tree (Because of the rule of random)

5- (4 and 5) is true.

6- so M is false

P.S. Don't try to reject 2 or 4

I Could Have Failed to Be a Person

I could have failed to be a person. There is a sense in which this claim is almost trivial. Had I not existed, I would not have been a person. I say almost trivial for two reasons. First, Kit Fine rejects the claim that: had I not existed, I would not have been a person (Fine, 2005). Second, some philosophers think that it is impossible for me to have failed to exist (see Williamson, 2002; Linsky and Zalta, 1994). These philosophers, however, think that I could have been non-concrete (which I understand as non-physical), and had I been non-concrete, I would not have been a person. So there is still a version of the argument above that is almost trivial to them.

I want to look at an argument for a stronger sense in which I could have failed to be a person. More specifically, I want to claim:

(P) It is possible for me to be a concrete object that is not a person.

My argument for (P) is as follows:

(1) I used to be an embryo.

(2) Necessarily, no embryo is a person.

(3) Necessarily, any  embryo is a concrete object.

(4) So, I used to be a concrete object that was not a person (1, 2, 3).

(P) So, it is possible for me to be a concrete object that is not a person (4).

The argument is valid. (P) follows from (4) by the plausible principle that everything that has been the case is also possibly the case (I've toyed with the idea of denying this principle, but that will be left for another day). (4) follows from (1), (2) and (3): Given (1), I was an embryo. Given (2), when I was an embryo, I was not a person. Given (3), When I was an embryo and not a person, I was a concrete object. So when I was an embryo, I was a concrete object that was not a person. Here is a defense of (1)-(3), in reverse order:

Defense of (3): In order for something to be an embryo, it must be located somewhere. But only concrete objects are located. So in order for something to be an embryo, it must be concrete. So necessarily, any embryo is a concrete object.

Defense of (2): In order for something to be a person, it must have rights. Necessarily, no embryos have rights. So, necessarily, no embryos are persons. Why think that no embryos have rights? Embryos are physically not much different than fungi (there are some differences, but not morally relevant ones). But necessarily, fungi don’t have rights. So necessarily, embryos don’t have rights.

Defense of (1): Here are two reasons for believing (1).

(i) Somewhere around March 1990, I was conceived. If I was conceived around that time, then I had a property at that time (HAVING-BEEN-CONCEIVED, for example). If I had a property at that time, then I existed at that time. So I existed at conception. 8 weeks later, the only thing in my mother’s uterus which had existed at conception was an embryo. So I used to be an embryo.

(ii) embryos are not essentially embryos. Embryos used to be zygotes, and zygotes are not embryos. So there is no reason to think, going the other way, that if something which is an embryo stops being an embryo, it will go out of existence. The thing which used to be an embryo in my mother’s uterus underwent several small changes, none of which would have been enough to destroy it. It became a fetus, and stopped being an embryo, but that is also not enough to destroy something, since embryos are not essentially embryos. Since fetuses are also not essentially fetuses, there is no reason to think that the fetus in my mother's uterus was destroyed when it underwent enough changes to no longer be a fetus. So there is no reason to think that the thing which used to be an embryo in my mother's uterus was ever destroyed. So there should be something around today which used to be an embryo in my mother's uterus. It seems plausible that whatever used to be an embryo in my mother's uterus is going to be located where I am. So either there is an ex-embryo coincident with me, or I used to be an embryo. But there is no ex-embryo coincident with me. So I used to be an embryo.

If my defenses are good, then we should believe (P). But there is a problem with (P). The following argument against (P) appears to be devastating:

(5) If I am essentially a person, then it is not possible for me to be a concrete object that is not a person.

(6) I am essentially a person.

(7) So, it is not possible for me to be a concrete object that is not a person.

The argument is valid by modus ponens, and (7) is the denial of (P). Here is a defense of the premises:

Defense of (5): Assume I am essentially a person. Then necessarily, if I am concrete, I am a person. But if necessarily, if I am concrete, I am a person, then it is impossible for me to be a concrete object that is not a person. So, under the assumption that I am essentially a person, it is impossible for me to be a concrete object that is not a person. So, if I am essentially a person, then it is not possible for me to be a concrete object that is not a person

Defense of (6): It would seem that it is in my nature to be a person; I am the kind of thing that is a must be a person. But if it is in my nature to be a person, then I am essentially a person. So, I am essentially a person.

I’m thinking of denying (5), but before I do, I thought I’d leave what I’ve already written for discussion. Tune in next week, where I take the single most plausible statement in this entire write-up and try to argue against it.

References:

Fine, Kit. 2005. "Necessity and Non-Existence," in Modality and Tense, New York: Oxford. 321-354
Linski, Bernard and Zalta, Edward. 1994. “In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic” Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 431-458

Williamson, Timothy. 2002. “Necessary Existents.” in A. O’Hear, ed., Logic, Thought and Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 233-251

 

A non-semantic-based argument for fictional realism

Hi everyone,

I just read an interesting paper by Alberto Voltolini, and I wanted to share the argument with you all.  Fictional realism, as many of you know, is the view that fictional characters exist.  Fictional realists, as Voltolini points out, typically rest their case on semantic arguments. The general move:  there are some sincerely asserted sentences that appear to make reference to fictional characters, and that appear to be true, so (given simple semantic assumptions) we should think fictional characters exist.  Voltolini thinks that it's possible for fictional anti-realists to continue to combat the traditional semantic argument by offering more and more complicated paraphrasing alternatives to the relevant sentences.  So, if that is true, it would be nice for the realist to offer a non-semantic-based argument in support of her view.  (You might even think that, regardless of the anti-realist's prospects for combating the semantic argument, it would be nice for realists to offer more arguments in favor of their view).  Voltolini's argument for realism is intended to be just that:

Voltolini’s ontological argument for fictional realism:

1.  There are fictional texts.
2. If (1), then there are sets of propositions that those texts non-connivingly express(call these sets ‘fictional worlds’).
3. So, there are fictional worlds.
4. If (3), then there are identity conditions for some existing entities that involve fictional characters.
5. So, there are identity conditions for some existing entities that involve fictional characters.
6. If (5), then fictional realism is true.
7. So, fictional realism is true.

Justification for (1):  Texts are syntactical entities composed of sentences.  There are some texts that are used as props for games of make-believe.  If there are some texts used as props for games of make-believe, then there are some fictional texts.  So, there are some fictional texts.

Justification for (2):  A fictional text’s use in normal contexts is conniving, because this is what is required for them to be treated as props in games of make-believe (in fact, what Voltolini appears to mean by 'conniving' is just inviting to make-believe, rather than sincerely asserting; depending on your view of make-believe, such sentences may not even express propositions, but rather pretend to express propositions).  There is nothing inherent to the text itself, however, that prevents it from having a non-conniving dimension.  In fact, when we engage in acts of make-believe with the text, part of what that requires is for us to imagine that some speaker (the narrator, for instance) is sincerely asserting the sentences that make up the text.  If such a text has a non-conniving dimension, the sentences constituting that text must express a set of propositions (for, this is just what comes from non-connivingly employed sentences, ie. sincerely asserted sentences – they express propositions).  This set of propositions will include those explicitly expressed by the sentences, and those implicitly expressed by the sentences (this corresponds with the intuitive thought that fictional works contain both explicit and implicit truths about the fictional world - according to Voltolini, the implicit propositions will be entailed by the explicit propositions).  It’s natural to call this set of non-connivingly expressed propositions 'the fictional world.'

(3) follows from modus ponens.

Justification for (4):  It’s possible for there to be two syntactically identical fictional texts coincidentally written by different authors at the same time in roughly the same location (suppose the two authors are neighbors, but that neither is aware of the other or their writings).  It is intuitive to think that these two authors wrote distinct fictional works about correspondingly distinct fictional worlds.  Since a fictional world is just the set of explicit and implicit propositions a fictional text expresses, then the difference between the two must amount to a difference between the sets of propositions.  What difference, however, could there be in two sets of propositions expressed by syntactically identical texts?  There appear to be two options:  the two sets differ in virtue of the ‘real’ (non-fictional) constituents of the proposition-members, or the two sets differ in virtue of the fictional constituents of the proposition-members.  It cannot be the real constituents of those propositions (if there are any), since (if there are any) such entities would be the same in both works (under the assumption that a name like 'Napolean' in a fictional text could refer to Napolean Boneparte, then it would do so in any work in which the name was so used).  So, what makes the two worlds distinct must be the fictional entities constituting some of those propositions.  But, saying that fictional entities are what make two syntactically identical texts express distinct fictional worlds is just to say that those fictional entities are what constitute (at least in part) the identity conditions of those worlds.  So, fictional entities are needed to fix the identity conditions of fictional worlds.  If fictional worlds exist, then fictional entities are needed to fix the identity conditions of some existing entities.

(5) follows from modus ponens.

Justification for (6):  We should think (6) is true because for something to play a role in the identity conditions of an existing entity, then that thing must itself exist.  Fictional realism is the view that fictional entities exist, so, if fictional entities play a role in the identity conditions of an existing entity, then fictional realism is true.

(7) follows from modus ponens.

Voltolini considers some objections, and I have some objections of my own in mind, but for now I'll simply post the argument to see what y'all think.

Principle of Sufficient Reason

(I have talked about this to some of you, but I thought it would be a good idea to get it out in writing).

The following is Alexander Pruss’ (2006) reconstruction of Peter van Inwagen’s (1983) argument against the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). (Roughly the principle of sufficient reason says that anything that is the case has a sufficient explanation for why it is the case. Pruss and others have restricted the principle to exclude necessary truths, so that only contingent truths are the kinds of things that need a sufficient explanation).

(1) If the PSR holds, then every true contingent proposition has an explanation.

(2) No necessary proposition explains a contingent proposition.

(3) No contingent proposition explains itself.

(4) If a proposition explains a conjunction, then it explains every conjunct.

(5) A proposition q explains a proposition p only if q is true.

(6) There is a Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact (BCCF) that is the conjunction of all true contingent propositions, perhaps with logical redundancies removed, and the BCCF is contingent.

(7) Assume PSR for reductio.

(8) So, the BCCF has an explanation, q. (1, 6, 7)

(9) So, the proposition q is not necessary. (2, 6, 8)

(10) So, q is a contingent true proposition. (5, 8, 9)

(11) So, q is a conjunct in the BCCF (6, 10)

(12) So, q is self explanatory. (4, 8, 11)

(13) But q is not self explanatiory. (3, 10)

(14) Therefore, PSR is false (7, 12, 13)

Pruss argues that we have good reason to reject (2) and (3). Spinoza denied (6), since he thought that there were no contingent facts at all (and therefore no conjunction of them). The rest of the premises seem plausible.

My objection is as follows: (1)-(14) is formally invalid.

It is hard to point out whether the fallacious inference is (9) or (10). Here is why:

(1) claims that every contingently true proposition has an explanation. The inference to (10) (and plausibly to (9) as well) assumes that the explanation of a contingently true proposition must itself be a proposition. In order to amend this, and make the argument valid, we should rewrite (1) as follows:

(1*) If the PSR holds, then every true contingent proposition has an explanation that is itself a proposition.

With (1*), the argument above is valid. But it is not clear to me that we should accept (1*). Consider the following account of explanation of conjunctive facts:

(A) The explanation of a conjunctive fact is the plurality of its conjuncts.

(A) contradicts (1*), since a plurality of conjuncts is not itself a proposition. But I take (A) to be fairly plausible. If we are looking for the explanation of a proposition of the form p & q, and we give an explanation of p, and an explanation of q, it does not look like there is anything left to explain.

Any thoughts?