I could
have failed to be a person. There is a sense in which this claim is almost trivial.
Had I not existed, I would not have been a person. I say almost trivial for two
reasons. First, Kit Fine rejects the claim that: had I not
existed, I would not have been a person (Fine, 2005). Second, some
philosophers think that it is impossible for me to have failed to exist (see
Williamson, 2002; Linsky and Zalta, 1994). These philosophers, however, think that I could have been non-concrete (which I understand as non-physical), and had I been non-concrete, I would not have
been a person. So there is still a version of the argument above that is almost
trivial to them.
I want to look
at an argument for a stronger sense in which I could have failed to be a
person. More specifically, I want to claim:
(P) It is
possible for me to be a concrete object that is not a person.
My argument
for (P) is as follows:
(1) I used
to be an embryo.
(2)
Necessarily, no embryo is a person.
(3) Necessarily,
any embryo is a concrete object.
(4) So, I
used to be a concrete object that was not a person (1, 2, 3).
(P) So, it
is possible for me to be a concrete object that is not a person (4).
The
argument is valid. (P) follows from (4) by the plausible principle that everything
that has been the case is also possibly the case (I've toyed with the idea of denying this principle, but that will be left for another day). (4) follows from (1), (2) and
(3): Given (1), I was an embryo. Given (2), when I was an embryo, I was not a
person. Given (3), When I was an embryo and not a person, I was a concrete
object. So when I was an embryo, I was a concrete object that was not a person. Here is a
defense of (1)-(3), in reverse order:
Defense of
(3): In order for something to be an embryo, it must be located somewhere. But
only concrete objects are located. So in order for something to be an embryo,
it must be concrete. So necessarily, any embryo is a concrete object.
Defense of
(2): In order for something to be a person, it must have rights. Necessarily, no
embryos have rights. So, necessarily, no embryos are persons. Why think that no
embryos have rights? Embryos are physically not much different than fungi
(there are some differences, but not morally relevant ones). But necessarily, fungi
don’t have rights. So necessarily, embryos don’t have rights.
Defense of
(1): Here are two reasons for believing (1).
(i) Somewhere around March 1990, I was conceived. If I was conceived around
that time, then I had a property at that time (HAVING-BEEN-CONCEIVED, for example). If I had
a property at that time, then I existed at that time. So I existed at conception. 8 weeks
later, the only thing in my mother’s uterus which had existed at conception was
an embryo. So I used to be an embryo.
(ii) embryos are not essentially
embryos. Embryos used to be zygotes, and zygotes are not embryos. So there is
no reason to think, going the other way, that if something which is an embryo
stops being an embryo, it will go out of existence. The thing which used to be
an embryo in my mother’s uterus underwent several small changes, none of which would
have been enough to destroy it. It became a fetus, and stopped being an embryo, but that is also
not enough to destroy something, since embryos are not essentially embryos. Since fetuses are also not essentially fetuses, there is no reason to think that the fetus in my mother's uterus was destroyed when it underwent enough changes to no longer be a fetus. So
there is no reason to think that the thing which used to be an embryo in my mother's uterus was ever
destroyed. So there should be something around today which used to be an
embryo in my mother's uterus. It seems plausible that whatever used to be an embryo in my mother's uterus is going to be located
where I am. So either there is an ex-embryo coincident with me, or I used to be
an embryo. But there is no ex-embryo coincident with me. So I used to be an
embryo.
If my
defenses are good, then we should believe (P). But there is a problem with (P).
The following argument against (P) appears to be devastating:
(5) If I am
essentially a person, then it is not possible for me to be a concrete object that
is not a person.
(6) I am
essentially a person.
(7) So, it
is not possible for me to be a concrete object that is not a person.
The
argument is valid by modus ponens, and (7) is the denial of (P). Here is a
defense of the premises:
Defense of
(5): Assume I am essentially a person. Then necessarily, if I am concrete, I am
a person. But if necessarily, if I am concrete, I am a person, then it is
impossible for me to be a concrete object that is not a person. So, under the
assumption that I am essentially a person, it is impossible for me to be a
concrete object that is not a person. So, if I am essentially a person, then it
is not possible for me to be a concrete object that is not a person
Defense of
(6): It would seem that it is in my nature to be a person; I am the kind of
thing that is a must be a person. But if it is in my nature to be a person,
then I am essentially a person. So, I am essentially a person.
I’m
thinking of denying (5), but before I do, I thought I’d leave what I’ve already
written for discussion. Tune in next week, where I take the single most
plausible statement in this entire write-up and try to argue against it.
References:
Fine, Kit. 2005. "Necessity and Non-Existence," in Modality and Tense, New York: Oxford. 321-354
Linski, Bernard and Zalta, Edward. 1994. “In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic” Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 431-458
Linski, Bernard and Zalta, Edward. 1994. “In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic” Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 431-458
Williamson,
Timothy. 2002. “Necessary Existents.” in A. O’Hear, ed., Logic, Thought and Language,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 233-251
It's been brought to my attention by David Doerksen and Eric Hawley that I was not very clear on what I take to be a person. I assume that persons are what ethicists talk about when figuring out whether somebody has moral rights, or whether they have intrinsic moral value. This is pretty hand-wavey, but I hope it's clear enough to get the point across.
ReplyDeleteThis is the information you want for the Fine article (I think):
ReplyDeleteFine, Kit. 2005. “Necessity and Non-Existence,” in Modality and Tense, New York: Oxford University Press (2005). 321-354.
The tension here might lie in an equivocation between two uses of 'I'. It's sometimes acceptable to use 'I' to refer to one's body, as in 'I want to be cremated after I die'. It could be that when you say 'I used to be an embryo', you're referring to your body, which used to be an embryo. You body, however, has no rights. You have rights, and that's why people have to respect your body.
ReplyDeleteIf you're referring to a person when you use 'I', it's unclear whether you used to be an embryo. One might think you came to be when you started having consciousness, or, if you go old school with your metaphysics of persons, you came to be when you started doing logic.
One might also dispute your premise that embryos have no rights. Embryos differ from Fungi in their future potential, which may be morally relevant.
@Carolyn: Thanks for the Kit Fine information. I've change the post to reflect this.
ReplyDelete@Dan: I think that you're right in that there are these two ways in which we can use the word 'I': one which refers to me, and one which refers to my body. I'm wondering, though, if something can be said here to push for 'I used to be in my mother's uterus' to be read as endorsing both senses, while 'I want to be cremated' to be read as just one.
My thought is as follows. When I claim 'I want to be cremated after I die', someone might interject and say: 'you mean you want your body cremated, right? You won't be around!' I'm inclined to think that most people will agree with the interjector and accept their disambiguation.
Suppose now that somebody says 'I used to kick a lot in my mother's uterus', and somebody interjects 'you mean your body used to kick a lot, right? you weren't around!' I'm less inclined here to accept the interjector's point. I would say that my body kicked a lot, but so did I!
I don't know if there's much to this point, but my intuitions go that way.
In terms of the morally relevant stuff, you're right. There is a lot to be said about what it takes to be a person. I just (unfairly) assumed that most people agree that embryos are not persons.
I think the tension in this argument lies in your defence of proposition (2). It seems to me that you are confusing the cause and effect of personhood and rights: "in order for something to be a person, it must have rights". Rights are recognized because of a 'things' personhood; as opposed to personhood being recognized because of a 'things' rights. The argument you are running ultimately is question begging insofar as your criterion for personhood is 'it must have rights', which presupposes personhood in the first place.
ReplyDelete@Anonymous: thanks for the comments. I think that there are moments in my exposition where I beg the question (like when I just assert that embryos have no rights without any argument; see my response to Dan), but I'm not sure I'm begging the question in the case you point out. I think the problem is that I was a bit sloppy and used the phrase "in order for", which can be interpreted in several ways. So let me make my defense of that step more explicit:
ReplyDelete(RIGHTS) All persons have rights.
The premise (RIGHTS) makes no claim about why rights (or personhood) are recognized. It could be that something has rights because it is a person, or it could be that something is a person because it has rights. Or the story could be more complicated. Whatever the story one tells is, I think there are good reasons to think that (RIGHTS) is true. But (RIGHTS) is enough to get me from 'embryos have no rights' to 'embryos are not persons'. So it's not clear to me that my argument is question begging.