I Could Have Failed to Be a Person

I could have failed to be a person. There is a sense in which this claim is almost trivial. Had I not existed, I would not have been a person. I say almost trivial for two reasons. First, Kit Fine rejects the claim that: had I not existed, I would not have been a person (Fine, 2005). Second, some philosophers think that it is impossible for me to have failed to exist (see Williamson, 2002; Linsky and Zalta, 1994). These philosophers, however, think that I could have been non-concrete (which I understand as non-physical), and had I been non-concrete, I would not have been a person. So there is still a version of the argument above that is almost trivial to them.

I want to look at an argument for a stronger sense in which I could have failed to be a person. More specifically, I want to claim:

(P) It is possible for me to be a concrete object that is not a person.

My argument for (P) is as follows:

(1) I used to be an embryo.

(2) Necessarily, no embryo is a person.

(3) Necessarily, any  embryo is a concrete object.

(4) So, I used to be a concrete object that was not a person (1, 2, 3).

(P) So, it is possible for me to be a concrete object that is not a person (4).

The argument is valid. (P) follows from (4) by the plausible principle that everything that has been the case is also possibly the case (I've toyed with the idea of denying this principle, but that will be left for another day). (4) follows from (1), (2) and (3): Given (1), I was an embryo. Given (2), when I was an embryo, I was not a person. Given (3), When I was an embryo and not a person, I was a concrete object. So when I was an embryo, I was a concrete object that was not a person. Here is a defense of (1)-(3), in reverse order:

Defense of (3): In order for something to be an embryo, it must be located somewhere. But only concrete objects are located. So in order for something to be an embryo, it must be concrete. So necessarily, any embryo is a concrete object.

Defense of (2): In order for something to be a person, it must have rights. Necessarily, no embryos have rights. So, necessarily, no embryos are persons. Why think that no embryos have rights? Embryos are physically not much different than fungi (there are some differences, but not morally relevant ones). But necessarily, fungi don’t have rights. So necessarily, embryos don’t have rights.

Defense of (1): Here are two reasons for believing (1).

(i) Somewhere around March 1990, I was conceived. If I was conceived around that time, then I had a property at that time (HAVING-BEEN-CONCEIVED, for example). If I had a property at that time, then I existed at that time. So I existed at conception. 8 weeks later, the only thing in my mother’s uterus which had existed at conception was an embryo. So I used to be an embryo.

(ii) embryos are not essentially embryos. Embryos used to be zygotes, and zygotes are not embryos. So there is no reason to think, going the other way, that if something which is an embryo stops being an embryo, it will go out of existence. The thing which used to be an embryo in my mother’s uterus underwent several small changes, none of which would have been enough to destroy it. It became a fetus, and stopped being an embryo, but that is also not enough to destroy something, since embryos are not essentially embryos. Since fetuses are also not essentially fetuses, there is no reason to think that the fetus in my mother's uterus was destroyed when it underwent enough changes to no longer be a fetus. So there is no reason to think that the thing which used to be an embryo in my mother's uterus was ever destroyed. So there should be something around today which used to be an embryo in my mother's uterus. It seems plausible that whatever used to be an embryo in my mother's uterus is going to be located where I am. So either there is an ex-embryo coincident with me, or I used to be an embryo. But there is no ex-embryo coincident with me. So I used to be an embryo.

If my defenses are good, then we should believe (P). But there is a problem with (P). The following argument against (P) appears to be devastating:

(5) If I am essentially a person, then it is not possible for me to be a concrete object that is not a person.

(6) I am essentially a person.

(7) So, it is not possible for me to be a concrete object that is not a person.

The argument is valid by modus ponens, and (7) is the denial of (P). Here is a defense of the premises:

Defense of (5): Assume I am essentially a person. Then necessarily, if I am concrete, I am a person. But if necessarily, if I am concrete, I am a person, then it is impossible for me to be a concrete object that is not a person. So, under the assumption that I am essentially a person, it is impossible for me to be a concrete object that is not a person. So, if I am essentially a person, then it is not possible for me to be a concrete object that is not a person

Defense of (6): It would seem that it is in my nature to be a person; I am the kind of thing that is a must be a person. But if it is in my nature to be a person, then I am essentially a person. So, I am essentially a person.

I’m thinking of denying (5), but before I do, I thought I’d leave what I’ve already written for discussion. Tune in next week, where I take the single most plausible statement in this entire write-up and try to argue against it.

References:

Fine, Kit. 2005. "Necessity and Non-Existence," in Modality and Tense, New York: Oxford. 321-354
Linski, Bernard and Zalta, Edward. 1994. “In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic” Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 431-458

Williamson, Timothy. 2002. “Necessary Existents.” in A. O’Hear, ed., Logic, Thought and Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 233-251